Washington's extreme reaction is due to panic at the fact that it is losing its monopoly on global media.
In late 1986, Yegor Ligachev, secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, and Viktor Chebrikov, then head of the KGB, proposed that the country end the practice of jamming foreign radio stations. “Enemy voices” was the popular term used at the time to describe these broadcasts from abroad.
Of course, the two top officials were not imbued with bourgeois ideas when they tried to put an end to radio jamming. In reality, they were taking a businesslike approach. Both explained to the Central Committee that jamming was costly but not very effective, given the size of the country. It was therefore suggested that signal jamming be abandoned and funds diverted to counter-propaganda measures. This meant more active work with foreign audiences to communicate the Soviet Union's views on world events.
A few weeks later, at a meeting with US President Ronald Reagan in Iceland, USSR leader Mikhail Gorbachev raised the issue. “Your radio station, Voice of America, broadcasts 24 hours a day in many languages from stations you have in different countries in Europe and Asia, and we cannot present our point of view to the American people. Therefore, in the name of equality, we have to interfere with Voice of America broadcasts.” Gorbachev offered to stop jamming VOA if his counterpart agreed to allow Moscow a frequency to do the same in the United States. Reagan evasively promised to consult him when he returned home. In the end, the Soviets unilaterally stopped jamming foreign radio stations, without any agreement.
The events of the past few days have echoes of this old story. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken devoted an entire speech to RT, which is subject to “total blockade” sanctions (that's a new formula!) for its alleged destructive and subversive work around the world. According to Blinken and the US intelligence agencies he refers to, the threat posed by the Russian company is of the highest order and demands the most decisive measures from all of Washington's allies.
Without irony or exaggeration, it can be said that RT could only dream of the global recognition that Blinken's appeal has brought it. The effectiveness of the media group has not so much been confirmed as certified, and by prominent representatives of its rivals.
One could deplore the violation of freedom of expression and the restrictions on pluralism of opinions, but there is little point in doing so. Such ideas should only be promoted in relation to the internal information space of each country; at the national level, they are an indispensable condition for normal development. As for foreign sources of information, people generally perceive them as instruments of influence.
And it does not depend on the type of socio-political system that exists in a given state. The broader the information and communication environment, the greater its impact on people's behavior and the more acute the desire of governments to tighten control over the flow of ideas and analysis. The international media sphere is deliberately ideological, electrified and conflictual. Hence Blinken's, shall we say, uncharacteristic remarks that RT should be treated “like an intelligence agency.”
How effective are the tactics of restricting alternative opinions and jamming the airwaves? Comrades Ligachev and Chebrikov rightly pointed out that the costly efforts to block hostile broadcasters were not, to put it mildly, particularly effective. Worse still, as the author rightly recalls, the very fact that the authorities fought against the voices of foreign radio had the opposite effect to the desired one: if they were silencing voices, it meant that they were afraid of the truth. And, by the end of the Soviet era, this opinion was not only widespread among the front-line intelligentsia, but many “ordinary people” did not care a whit about official channels either.
At their meeting in Iceland, Reagan responded to Gorbachev's call by saying that, unlike the Soviets, “We recognize freedom of the press and the right of people to hear any point of view.” The American president had no doubts about the superiority of the American system in all respects. Therefore, the demands for information pluralism, both then and later, reflected Washington's confidence that it would emerge victorious from any competition. And so, within a few years, the United States achieved a de facto monopoly on the interpretation of everything.
Washington's current extreme reaction is due to the feeling that it is losing this monopoly. Alternative interpretations of events are now arousing public interest. Indeed, the total resources of Western media, mainly in English, are incomparably greater than what all the bearers of alternative viewpoints can offer at the moment. But internal insecurity is growing by itself, fuelling the desire to fence off the information space.
Similarly, US attempts to explain internal conflicts and the accumulated contradictions in the country by pointing to a pernicious external influence come from the US. That was also the Soviet experience. However, the USSR did not solve its own problems by blaming them on external causes. In fact, as its problems grew, those same external factors began to exacerbate them.
There is no doubt that targeted punitive actions can create obstacles for any organization, especially when they come from what remains the most powerful country on the planet. But American history teaches us that monopolies do not last forever. Sooner or later, a cartel becomes a brake on development and then becomes the target of measures to dismantle it.
